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We investigate how protectionist policies influence economic growth. Our
empirical strategy exploits an extraordinary tax scandal that gave rise to an un-
expected change of government in Sweden. A free-trade majority in parliament
was overturned by a comfortable protectionist majority in the fall of 1887. We
employ the synthetic control method to select control countries against which
economic growth in Sweden can be compared. We do not find evidence suggest-
ing that protectionist policies influenced economic growth and examine channels
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1 Introduction
How trade policies influence economic growth has been examined for a long time.
Empirical evidence based on data for the late 20th and the early 21st century suggests
that protectionist policies decrease economic growth (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995;
Edwards, 1998; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000; Dreher, 2006;
Eaton et al., 2016; Gygli et al., 2019; Andersen et al., 2020). The empirical evidence
from the late 19th and the early 20th century is less conclusive; most studies report
a positive correlation between tariffs and economic growth (‘tariff-growth paradox’)
(e.g., Bairoch, 1972; Irwin, 1998, 2002; O’Rourke, 2000; Lehmann and O’Rourke, 2011;
Schularick and Solomou, 2011). The previous studies on trade policies and growth in
the first era of globalization report correlations and do not provide causal evidence on
the impact of protectionism. We use an unexpected change of government to estimate
the causal effect of a protectionist regime on growth in Sweden in the late 1880s.
Our empirical strategy exploits that an extraordinary tax scandal gave rise to an
unexpected change of government in Sweden. A free-trade majority in parliament was
overturned by a comfortable protectionist majority in the fall of 1887. Swedish trade
policies had been liberal for decades in the 19th century. Advocates of free trade (free-
traders) also won the Swedish national elections in 1887. Shortly after the fall election
of 1887, an extraordinary event took place. A free-trade candidate for the Stockholm
electoral district had outstanding tax liabilities. Based on the parliamentary act of
1866, the election committee declared him an illegitimate candidate and discarded all
6,585 ballots that included his name. In January 1888, the supreme court confirmed the
decision of the election committee and officially instated 22 protectionist candidates as
representatives for the Stockholm electoral district in the Riksdag. As a result, the free-
trade majority of the fall election (125 free-traders, 97 protectionists1) was overturned
by a comfortable protectionist majority (119 protectionists, 103 free-traders), and the
free-trade government resigned. A protectionist government took office in February
1888 and drastically increased tariffs. This unexpected change of government provides
an ideal case for investigating how protectionist policies influence short-term economic
growth.
We employ the synthetic control (SC) method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) to
1Some sources claim that the initial result was 124 free-traders and 98 protectionists (e.g. Lindorm,
1936).
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select control countries against which economic growth in Sweden can be compared.
We do not find evidence suggesting that protectionist policies influenced short-run
economic growth in 19th century Sweden. Our results show that tariffs increased
government revenue. However, there is no evidence that the protectionist government
increased government expenditure to stimulate the economy in the short-run.
Our study contributes to the literature examining the tariff-growth nexus in the
late 20th and 21st century (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998; Frankel and
Romer, 1999; Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000; Dreher, 2006; Eaton et al., 2016; Gygli et al.,
2019; Andersen et al., 2020) and in the late 19th and early 20th century (e.g., Bairoch,
1972; Irwin, 1998, 2002; O’Rourke, 2000; Lehmann and O’Rourke, 2011; Schularick and
Solomou, 2011).
Methodologically, our paper is related to the growing body of work using the syn-
thetic control method to make causal inference in aggregate panel data settings (e.g.,
Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013; Pinotti, 2015; Cunningham and Shah, 2018; Andersson,
2019; Born et al., 2019).
2 The 1887 change in government
Sweden pursued a liberal trade policy since Louis De Geer became Prime Minister for
Justice in 1858 (Rustow, 1955).2 In 1885, members of both chambers of the Swedish
parliament started to organize themselves according to their stance on trade policy
(Rustow, 1955; Lewin, 1988). The result was a face-off between free-traders and pro-
tectionists. The free-traders won the election in fall 1887 by a large margin (Anders-
son, 1950).3 Thus, it was very likely that the liberal trade policy would be continued.
Shortly after the fall election, an unexpected event took place that was called “sen-
sational” (Lewin, 1988), “preposterous” (Carlsson and Rosén, 1961) and “scandalous”
(Esaiasson, 1990). News outlets all over Sweden covered the events in Stockholm’s
electoral district. We reviewed hundreds of articles from regional and national Swedish
newspapers from before the September 1887 election up to 25 January 1888.4 The
2Louis De Geer was Prime Minister for Justice from 1858 to 1870 and again from 1875 to 1876.
He became the first Swedish Prime Minister in 1876.
3Lehmann and Volckart (2011) describe which voters were supporting free-traders and protection-
ists.
4We used a search algorithm with key words and time periods for Swedish newspaper articles
provided by the National Library of Sweden (Kungliga biblioteket, KB).
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change in parliamentary majorities in the aftermath of the 1887 fall election occurred
unexpectedly. We find no indication that the tax fraud was known before the election
and that the protectionists set up a strategic play to overturn the overwhelming free-
trade majority in Stockholm by planning to appeal the election based on a candidate’s
tax liabilities.
Stockholm’s electoral district was entitled to 22 seats in the second chamber of
parliament (Rustow, 1955). Citizens in Stockholm elected only free-traders into par-
liament by large vote margins.5 The election’s appeal period lasted until October 4,
1887. Two citizens filed appeals against the election results in Stockholm’s electoral
district (Stockholms Dagblad, 1887). The appeal by Wilhelm Alexander Bergstrand,
the publisher of the newspaper Nya Dagligt Allehanda, induced a political turmoil in
Stockholm and soon after in the whole country.
On October 4, 1887, shorty before the appeal period ended, Bergstrand submitted
his appeal and published it in Nya Dagligt Allehanda on the same day (Bergstrand,
1887). He had been investigating the Stockholm Riksdag candidates on his own ini-
tiative. In his appeal, Bergstrand claimed that Olof Larsson, one of the 22 free-trade
candidates, owed a small amount of crown and municipal taxes for 1881 and 1882.
According to paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Parliament Act of 1866 the candidate with
tax debt is disqualified and all votes with the candidate’s name are invalid (Lagerbjelke
et al., 1866). Bergstrand demanded that all ballot papers including Larsson’s name
be declared invalid. He further demanded a recount of all valid votes. On October
5, 1887, Bergstrand published proof for Larsson’s tax liabilities: The tax collection
commissioner for Adolf Fredriks and Kungsholms (two districts in Stockholm), issued
a certificate confirming Larsson’s tax liabilities the day before (Geete, 1887).
Events unraveled during the following days. Many newspapers published opinions
about the legitimacy of the appeal. Larsson’s statement in Aftonbladet, one of the most
influential newspapers at the time, disputed any tax liabilities but remained without the
intended effect (Larsson, 1887). On October 12, 1887, the election committee accepted
Bergstrand’s appeal and invalidated all ballot papers with Larsson’s name on them
(Lindorm, 1936). It ordered a recount of the votes and declared the 22 protectionist
candidates winners of the election. Disputes followed and the decision of the election
committee was challenged. On January 25, 1888, the supreme court ruled that the
6,585 ballot papers with Larsson’s name on them are indeed invalid and officially
5Stockholm was the main stronghold of free-trade sentiment at this time.
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instated the 22 protectionist candidates as legitimate representatives of the electoral
district of Stockholm in the Riksdag. The free-trade majority in the second chamber
of parliament (125 free-traders, 97 protectionists) was overturned by a comfortable
protectionist majority (119 protectionists, 103 free-traders).6 As a result, the liberal
government resigned on 6 February 1888, and the experienced protectionist Gillis Bildt
became prime minister.7 In February 1888, Bildt’s government issued the first tariff
laws raising tariffs on agricultural products in a first step from duty free to around 15
percent and subsequently to more than 20 percent (Andersson, 1950; Rustow, 1955;
Bohlin, 2005). Figure 1 shows the main events on a timeline.
Figure 1: The 1887/1888 change in government
1887 1888
24 September 1887
Election results: 
FT 125 seats vs. PT 97 seats
Liberal Government confirmed
12 October 1887
Exogeneous shock: 
Free-trade majority 
overturned
6 February 1888
New Parliament: 
FT 103 seats vs. PT 119 seats
Protectionist Government 
inaugurated
Tariffs
FT
PT
free-traders
protectionists
25 January 1888
Supreme Court
confirms decision
Source: Own illustration
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
We use data from the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor (JST) Macrohistory Database (Jordà
et al., 2017). The JST Database includes annual data for 17 advanced economies
since 1870. It encompasses measures of GDP8, imports, exports, government revenue,
6Both chambers of parliament decide on trade policy and each representative has one vote.
7Bildt served as Swedish ambassador in Berlin when the Reichstag under Bismarck introduced the
agrarian protectionist system in 1879.
8We use real GDP per capita (index, 2005=100).
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and government expenditure. Data comes from a broad range of historical sources
and various publications of governments, statistical offices, central banks and private
banks. For some countries they extended data series from university databases, and
international organizations. The main source for our GDP measure is the Macroeco-
nomic Data Set (Barro and Ursúa, 2010). Most trade and national account data come
from Mitchel (2007), Flora et al. (1983), IMF international financial statistics, OECD
national accounts statistics and national statistics offices.
We examine data until the year 1890, because the next election took place in the
fall 1890. The free-traders won this election.
3.2 Synthetic control
To estimate how protectionism influences economic growth, we use the SC method
invented by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); see Abadie (2019) for a review. SC
can be viewed as a generalization of the classical difference-in-differences approach.
The main insight underlying the SC method is that a weighted average of control
units often provides a more accurate approximation to the unobserved counterfac-
tual than any individual control unit or a simple average of control units as used in
difference-in-differences analyses. To avoid concerns about specification search, we use
the pre-treatment outcomes to estimate the SC weights and do not include additional
predictors.
To make inferences, we use the permutation method proposed by Abadie et al.
(2010).9 We permute the treatment assignment and estimate placebo treatment effects
for all control countries. This yields a distribution of placebo effects against which the
effect estimate for Sweden can be compared. If the treatment is randomly assigned,
this procedure corresponds to classical randomization inference (Fisher, 1935).
3.3 Choice of donor pool
To approximate what would have happened to Sweden in the absence of the change
of government, we only include countries in the JST database which had free-trade
governments from 1870 to 1890. We exclude countries that implemented protectionist
9The permutation inference procedure is a design-based approach that exploits the assignment
mechanism. Alternative sampling-based inference procedures were proposed, for instance, by Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2019a), Chernozhukov et al. (2019b), and Li (2019).
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trade policies from 1870 to 1890 from the donor pool. From the 17 countries available in
the JST Database, we exclude France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal because of
protectionist trade policies.10 Data is missing for Australia and Japan. Therefore, our
donor pool includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.11
4 Results: Protectionism and growth
The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows real GDP per capita for each donor pool
country and Sweden from 1870 to 1890. Sweden’s GDP is depicted in thick black, and
the other donor pool countries’ GDPs are depicted in grey. The upper right panel of
Figure 2 shows how real GDP per capita developed in Sweden and synthetic Sweden
over the period 1870–1890. The synthetic Sweden consists of 21.7% of Denmark, 43.6%
of Finland, 17.3% of Norway, 0.3% of the United Kingdom and 17.0% of the United
States (see Appendix A).
10We use country classifications of previous studies (e.g., O’Rourke et al., 1996; O’Rourke, 2000;
Irwin, 1998, 2002; Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2004; Williamson, 2006;
Schularick and Solomou, 2011) and classify countries either as “protectionist”/“tariff hikers” or “free-
trade”/“non-tariff hikers”.
11An important requirement for SC analyses is that the donor pool of control countries is homoge-
neous enough (Abadie, 2019). All countries in our donor pool were industrializing during the 1870s
and 1880s. Citizens or elected representatives of the citizens possessed substantial political power and
influenced national policies.
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Figure 2: Real GDP per capita
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We find no evidence suggesting that protectionism influenced GDP. From 1870 to
1887, Sweden’s average real GDP per capita grew from 5.92 to 7.10 (average annual
growth rate (AAGR): 1.07 percent), and synthetic Sweden’s average real GDP per
capita grew from 6.15 to 7.36 (AAGR: 1.06 percent). After the change in government,
from 1887 to 1890, Sweden’s average real GDP per capita grew from 7.10 to 7.64
(AAGR: 2.47 percent), and synthetic Sweden’s average real GDP per capita grew from
7.36 to 7.81 (AAGR: 2.01 percent).
To make inferences, we iteratively re-assign the treatment to every country in the
donor pool. Because SC does not yield good pre-treatment fits for some control coun-
tries, we exclude countries for which the pre-treatment MSPE (mean squared prediction
error) is at least 10 times larger than Sweden’s pre-treatment MSPE (lower left panel
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of Figure 2). The results do not suggest that the effect of protectionism on GDP in
Sweden was large relative to the distribution of placebo effects. Since the cutoff of 10
is arbitrary, we also report the ratio of post-treatment root MSPE (RMSPE) to pre-
treatment RMSPE, as suggested by Abadie et al. (2015). A large ratio of post- and
pre-treatment RMSPE is indicative of a true effect. The lower right panel of Figure
2 suggests that the ratio of post- and pre-treatment RMSPE was not large in Sweden
compared to the other countries in the donor pool.
5 Channels
We examine channels for why there is no evidence suggesting that protectionism influ-
enced economic growth. We focus on outcomes of international trade and fiscal policies
that are, in turn, likely to influence short-run economic growth.
5.1 Imports
It is conceivable that protectionism decreased imports, especially from those countries
from which Sweden imported a substantial fraction of its goods. However, Figure 3
does not suggest that the introduction of tariffs decreased imports. The total value of
imports increased from 297.410.000 kronor in 1887 to 324.709.000 kronor in 1888 (see
Appendix B). The protectionist tariff policy in early 1888 did not reverse the steady
growth of imports. The total value of imports as a share of GDP increased from 14.95
percent in 1870 to 23.87 percent in 1887. In 1888, imports as a share of GDP increased
to 25.23 percent and reached 26.37 percent in 1890. We also do not find evidence
that aggregate import levels masked heterogeneous effects of the Swedish tariffs on
individual trading partners; see Appendix B for information on how Swedish imports
from individual countries developed between 1870 and 1890.12
12We also investigate whether the Swedish protectionist policies decreased imports from countries
which depend on exporting their goods to Sweden. A substantial decrease of exports to Sweden would
have likely impacted GDP in these countries. However, Sweden was a minor trade partner for all
donor pool countries. Exports to Sweden as a share of total exports did not exceed 15 percent for any
donor pool country and were much smaller for most countries.
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Figure 3: Imports as a share of GDP
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5.2 Government revenue
We examine whether protectionist policies influence government revenue. Higher tariffs
may well have increased government revenue, which could be used, for example, to
increase government expenditure and to stimulate short-term economic growth.
10
Figure 4: Government revenue as a share of GDP
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Figure 4 shows that the protectionist policies enacted after the change of govern-
ment increased government revenue. The ratio of post-treatment to pre-treatment
RMSPE is the largest for Sweden resulting in a permutation p-value of 1/9 (the small-
est possible permutation p-value). Government revenue was 81.11 million SEK in 1887.
It increased by 16.02 percent to 94.11 million SEK in 1888. As a share of GDP, gov-
ernment revenue increased from 6.65 percent to 7.35 percent. The effect holds for 1889
and 1890. Meanwhile, synthetic Sweden’s government revenue as a share of GDP de-
creased from 6.70 percent in 1887 to 6.65 percent in 1888. It remained relatively stable
until 1890 (1889: 6.61 percent, 1890: 6.69 percent). Customs revenue were responsible
for the increase in government revenue (see Appendix C for a description of Swedish
fiscal policies 1888–1890). In 1888/89 customs revenue as a share of total government
11
revenue reached its absolute maximum over the period from 1830 to 1913 (42 percent)
(Häggqvist, 2018). Because imports did not decrease when the protectionist policies
were introduced, it is unlikely that tariffs were systematically circumvented.13
5.3 Government expenditure
Figure 5 shows the SC estimates for government expenditure. The results do not
suggest that the protectionists influenced government expenditure. If anything, they
decreased government expenditure. Swedish government expenditure as a share of
GDP decreased from 8.19 percent in 1887 to 6.92 percent in 1890. Synthetic Sweden’s
government expenditure as a share of GDP increased from 6.92 percent to 7.31 percent
over the same period.
13Further, it is unlikely that goods destined for Sweden were shipped to Norway and then crossed
country borders on rail by investigating Norway’s exports to Sweden after 1887; see Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Government expenditure as a share of GDP
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Sweden went from a large primary budget deficit in 1887 to a small primary budget
surplus in 1888. The primary budget surplus increased in 1889 and 1890. In both
years, Sweden had a total budget surplus and total government debt decreased.
6 Sensitivity: In-time placebo and leave-one-out
We submit the estimated effect of protectionism on government revenue to two sen-
sitivity checks proposed by Abadie et al. (2015). First, we backdate the treatment
and consider a placebo treatment in the previous election year (1884). A significant
effect of the placebo treatment would threaten the credibility of our findings. The left
panel of Figure 6 shows the results from the permutation inference procedure, which
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do not indicate an effect of the placebo treatment on government revenue. The ratio of
post-treatment to pre-treatment RMSPE for Sweden is smaller than one (not shown),
and the implied permutation p-value is 6/9.
Second, we perform a “leave-one-out” sensitivity analysis to examine whether our
finding is driven by influential control units. We iteratively exclude each control coun-
try with positive weights when applying SC. The right panel of Figure 6 shows the
results. We find that the effect of protectionism on government revenue is not driven
by influential control units.
Figure 6: Government revenue: Placebo treatment in 1884 and leave-one-out
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7 Conclusion
Previous studies did not yet explain the ‘tariff-growth paradox’ in the first era of
globalization: Protectionism was shown to decrease economic growth in the 20th and
21st century, but tariffs and growth were positively correlated in the late 19th century.
We provide causal evidence on how protectionist policies influenced economic growth
in the late 19th century. We exploit an exogenous shock, unique in Sweden’s history,
that changed the parliamentary majority from free-trade to protectionist. The new
protectionist government increased tariffs.
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Using the SC method, we do not find evidence suggesting that the protectionist
policies influenced short-run economic growth in late 19th century Sweden. An in-
teresting question is why. The results show that the increased tariffs did not deter
Sweden’s trading partners from exporting goods to Sweden. The protectionist govern-
ment increased revenue but refrained from stimulating the economy in the short-run by
increasing government expenditure. Instead, it used the increased government revenue
to reduce public debt.
Further research needs to continue causally investigating the ‘tariff-growth paradox’
in the first era of globalization. The short-run effects of protectionism are likely to
be context-specific (Eichengreen, 2019). It would further be interesting to examine
how individual tariffs (agricultural tariffs, industrial tariffs, fiscal tariffs) influenced
government revenue and growth (Lehmann and O’Rourke, 2011).
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A Weights to measure the synthetic Sweden
Table 1: Weights to measure the synthetic Sweden by outcome
GDP Imports Government Government
Revenue Expenditure
Belgium 0 0 0.128 0
Canada 0 0 0.410 0
Denmark 0.217 0.365 0.061 0.222
Finland 0.436 0 . .
Netherlands 0 0.102 0.126 0.229
Norway 0.173 0 0 0.052
Switzerland 0 . 0 0
UK 0.003 0 0.231 0.314
USA 0.170 0.532 0.045 0.182
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B Swedish imports by trade partner
Figure 7: Swedish imports by trade partner: 1870 to 1890
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C Swedish fiscal policies 1888–1890
C.1 Government revenue
Customs revenue as a share of total government revenue was around 40 percent from
1888 to 1890 — the highest value over the period from 1830 to 1913 (Häggqvist, 2018).
The composition of customs revenue changed drastically from 1887 to 1888. While,
in 1887, agricultural products did not generate any customs revenue, the share of
agricultural customs revenue of total customs revenue increased to almost 20 percent
in 1888 (Häggqvist, 2018). The shares from coffee and sugar decreased. Changes in
the shares of alcohol, fabrics, and tobacco were very small. Customs revenue coming
from industrial products was low; its share of total customs revenue was only around
3 percent and just slightly increased.14
Consumption taxes also generated substantial government revenue. However, con-
sumption tax rates hardly changed over the period 1862 to 1913. Consumption tax
revenues ranged between 15 to 20 percent of total government revenue (Stenkula, 2015).
The protectionist government did not increase direct tax rates from 1888 to 1890. Over-
all, increased customs revenues were responsible for the increase in total government
revenue and the surplus in the state coders (Beck et al., 1911).
C.2 Government expenditure
The increased government revenue gave rise to financial desires across the parliamen-
tary benches and the royal court. On October 12, 1888, Oscar II15 declared at the
Council of State that he wishes to spend the surplus from increased customs revenue
on insurance and pensions, the abolition of the land taxes, and lowering of the munici-
pal taxes. However, the Riksdag devoted the increased government revenue to balance
the budget deficit, the building of railways, and increased defense spending (Beck et al.,
1911). Overall, the budget composition changed little after the majority in parliament
changed (Schön and Krantz, 2012).
14From 1888 to 1890, changes in industrial tariffs were far less pronounced than changes in agricul-
tural tariffs. Sweden was still bound to the commercial treaty with France, which prevented substantial
increases of industrial tariffs. After the treaty expired in 1892, Sweden also increased industrial tariffs
substantially.
15Oscar II was King of Sweden from 1872–1907.
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